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Abstract 
We  evaluate  household  transport  consumption  inequalities  in  France,  Denmark  and  Cyprus, 
investigate their temporal dynamics and estimate the redistributive effects of taxes on different 
commodity categories. A comparative analysis is carried out in light of the differences between 
these  countries,  most  notably  in  terms  of  car  taxation  systems  and  car  ownership  levels.  A 
decomposition by expenditure component of the Gini index is applied, using household-level data 
from  repeated  cross-sections  of  expenditure  surveys  spanning  long  time  periods.  The  results 
highlight the effect of car social diffusion. The relative contribution of vehicle use items to total 
expenditure inequality decreases over time, thus reflecting the more and more widespread use of 
the car. Moreover, fuel taxes become regressive (i.e. they affect the poor more than the rich), while 
the progressive character of taxes on the remaining car use commodities weakens with time. Taxes 
on transport goods and services as a whole are progressive (i.e. they affect the rich more than the 
poor). However, this is principally due to the progressivity of taxes on automobile purchases. The 
progressivity of taxes on car purchases is by far much stronger in Denmark. In this country, these 
taxes are so high that car purchase costs can be afforded only by high incomes. These findings 
underline the fact that equity issues should not be overlooked when designing policies to attenuate 
the environmental impact of cars. Increasing car use costs, notably fuel prices, through an increase 
of uniform taxes would be particularly inequitable. 
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Car taxes are a source of public revenues as well as a policy tool to reduce adverse impacts of 
road traffic. Most of them were instituted in a time where the car was a luxury good (e.g. the 
French vignette, an annual tax on vehicles owned, in 1956; registration tax in Denmark as 
early as 1924). The large social diffusion of this good over the past decades has doubtless 
lessened the progressivity of these taxes. The protests in several European countries against 
the rapid increase in fuel prices during autumn 2000 highlighted the sensitivity to the burden 
of fuel costs, not only of professionals but also of households, particularly those in rural and 
suburban areas who are more car-dependent. 
In this paper, we evaluate inequalities between households regarding the consumption of 
transport goods and services in France, Denmark and Cyprus, investigate their temporal 
dynamics and estimate the redistributive effects of taxes on the different commodity 
categories considered. A comparative analysis is carried out in light of the differences 
between these countries, most notably in terms of car taxation systems and car ownership 
levels. Consumption is measured in terms of expenditures collected through budget surveys. 
As Deaton (1997) puts it, by revealing who buys each good or service and the amounts spent, 
expenditure surveys tell us who bears the most of the corresponding taxes (notably, according 
to income level) and thus the potential losers and gainers from possible changes in taxation. 
The analysis applies a decomposition of the Gini inequality indicator by expenditure 
component. Each component appears through its proper Gini coefficient, its budget share and 
its degree of association with total expenditure. This method provides a better understanding 
of the inequality mechanisms, in particular their temporal evolution. Moreover, it allows 
evaluating the redistributive effect of (a change in) a tax on a good or a service. By 
redistributive effect, it is meant the impact in terms of inequality increase or reduction. 
Finally, it furnishes estimates of elasticities with respect to total expenditure (or income) 
without specifying a functional form for the Engel curves.  
The data are from repeated cross-sections of household expenditure surveys. For each 
country, a few distant survey periods (about 10 years apart) are selected among the accessible 
data sets: three for France (1978-79, 1989 and 2000-01), two for Cyprus (1991 and 2003), and 
two for Denmark (1997 and 2005). The number of surveyed French households is of 10,645 
in 1978-79, 9,038 in 1989 and 10,305 in 2000-01. In Cyprus, the sample is comprised of 
2,708 households in 1991 and 2,990 households in 2003. For Denmark, there are observations 
for 881 households from the 1997 survey and 725 households from the 2005 survey. 
After an exposition of the methodology of Gini decomposition by expenditure component 
in the next section, Section 3 presents some of the characteristics of the car taxation systems 
in the three countries and examines the budget shares allocated to different expenditure 
groups according to household’s standard of living. Section 4 presents the results of the 
analyses of inequality and redistributive effects of taxes on the different categories of goods 
and services considered. The last section summarises the findings and concludes. 
 
2. DECOMPOSITION OF THE GINI COEFFICIENT BY COMPONENT AND 
REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF MARGINAL CHANGES IN COMPONENTS 
 
2.1. The Gini Inequality Index 
The Gini coefficient is one of the more widely used indicators to evaluate inequalities (of 
income, wealth, consumption…). A graphic visualisation of this index is based on the Lorenz 
curve, shown in Figure 1. The Lorenz curve of income, for instance, is constructed by 
arranging individuals from the poorest to the richest, and then representing their cumulative 
share of total income as a function of their cumulative proportion in the population. A. Berri, S. Vincent Lyk-Jensen, I. Mulalic and T. Zachariadis  3
 
If each individual had the same income, the curve would coincide with the main diagonal, 
the income share of a given group being equal to its weight in the total population. Apart from 
the case of perfect equality, the groups with the lowest incomes enjoy a share of total income 
that is lower than their weight in the population. Consequently, except in the case of perfect 
equality, every Lorenz curve lies below the main diagonal and its slope increases (in any case, 
it does not decrease) as one moves towards the highest incomes. 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of a Lorenz curve 
 
























































This graphic tool plays an important role in the characterisation of the robustness of 
inequality measures as to ranking distributions (Atkinson, 1970; Deaton, 1997). Thus, if the 
Lorenz curve of a distribution Y  lies everywhere below that of another distribution  X ,   is 
less egalitarian than 
Y
X . Indeed, the distribution Y  can be transformed by a series of transfers 
from the richer to the poorer in such a way to obtain the distribution  X . Consequently, when 
two Lorenz curves do not cross, the upper one represents a more egalitarian distribution and 
will show a lower inequality level provided the inequality measure used satisfies the principle 
of transfers. The principle of transfers is stated as follows: if one transfers an amount d  from 
a person having an income   to another person having a lower income   (with  , 
such that the transfer does not reverse their relative positions), then the new distribution 
should be preferred to the initial one. In the case where two Lorenz curves intersect, it is not 
possible to rank unambiguously the corresponding distributions as to their degree of 
inequality, unless restraining choice to specific inequality measures. 
1 y 2 y 21 yy d ≤−
The Gini coefficient is defined as the ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve and the 
main diagonal (designated by A in Figure 1) to the area of the triangle below the diagonal 
(i.e.,  12), that is  2 GA = . When the distribution is perfectly egalitarian, its Lorenz curve 
coincides with the diagonal, hence  0 A=  and  0 G = . Absolute inequality implies that  A is 
the whole area of the triangle under the diagonal, so  12 A =  and  . Thus, the Gini 
coefficient takes values between 0 and 1. 
1 G =
One of the appeals of the Gini coefficient as a measure of (income) inequality is that it is 
“a very direct measure of (income) difference, taking note of differences between every pair 
of (incomes)” (Sen, 1997, p. 31). Indeed, one of its expressions (the original definition) is A. Berri, S. Vincent Lyk-Jensen, I. Mulalic and T. Zachariadis  4
 
based on the average of absolute differences between pairs of observations, called Gini’s 
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The Gini coefficient is defined as the GMD divided by twice the mean ( ):  m









= ∑∑ j y y − . (1) 
Another convenient feature of the Gini coefficient is that it handles negative values, which is 
in particular useful in its decomposition by income source, where taxes are considered as 
“negative incomes” (Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1994). 
Besides equation (1), the Gini coefficient has several expressions (Sen, 1997). In the 
following, we adopt a formulation that is easy to implement directly on individual data. This 
formulation is used to obtain a decomposition by the constituents of the variable of interest. 
The decomposition makes explicit the mechanisms by which each component contributes to 
the global Gini and therefore enlightens the temporal patterns of inequalities. Besides, it 
enables evaluating the redistributive effects of taxes on the different components. 
 
2.2. A Practical Formulation of the Gini Coefficient 
Lerman and Yitzhaki (1984) show that the Gini coefficient can be expressed as a function of 
the covariance between the variable of interest ( X ) and its cumulative distribution ( ), and 




2cov( , ) X XF
GX
m
= . (2) 
Estimation of the Gini coefficient using this formulation is easy to implement on individual 
survey data. Indeed, one only has to estimate the mean of  X  and the covariance between  X  
and its empirical cumulative distribution, and to substitute for the corresponding terms in the 
expressions above. With a random sample (same selection probability for all individuals) of 
size  , the cumulative distribution is estimated by ranking individuals according to increasing 
values of 
n
X  and by dividing their ranks   by the sample size, i.e.  i X FI =   n , and the mean is 
estimated by  i
i
mx =∑   n . In the case of a non-random sample (selection probability varying 
from one individual to another), the observations have to be weighted by the respective 






































1 A derivation of  ˆ
X F  can be found in (Berri, 2005), pp. 246-248. A. Berri, S. Vincent Lyk-Jensen, I. Mulalic and T. Zachariadis  5
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By avoiding the usual practice of grouping data prior to estimation, this approach yields 
estimates that are more accurate and free of the (downward) bias due to aggregation. Lerman 
and Yitzhaki (1989) show that this bias increases with the aggregation level and with the 
value of the Gini coefficient. 
 
2.3. Decomposition of the Gini Coefficient by Component 
This covariance-based formulation is used by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) to obtain a 
decomposition of the Gini coefficient by the constituents of X and apply it to the analysis of 
the effects of income sources on the global income inequality. Garner (1993) applies it to the 
analysis of inequalities in terms of expenditures.  
Consider the case where X  is household’s total expenditure. Let   be the 
amounts spent on the K  budget components, such that: 








=∑ . (3) 
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Let   and   be the cumulative distribution and the mean of  , respectively. 
Multiplying and dividing each term in   in equation (4) by 
k F k m k x
k ( ) cov , kk x F  and by  , one 
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Denoting the first term of the sum by  , the second by  , and the third by  , the Gini 
coefficient can be written: 
k R k G k S
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where   is the Gini correlation coefficient between expenditure k and total expenditure,   
is the Gini coefficient of component k , and  k  is its budget share. A high Gini correlation for 
a category of goods and services means that expenditure devoted to this category is higher the 
higher the total budget. Gini correlation is a measure of association based on Gini’s Mean 
Difference (Schechtman and Yitzhaki, 1987). The Gini correlation between two variables 
takes values between –1 and 1. It is equal to zero if the two variables are independent. For 
example, if one of the variables is a monotonously increasing function of the other, their Gini 
correlation will be equal to 1. Further details can be found in the Annex. 
k R k G
S
Thus, the contribution of an expenditure category to total inequality is determined by three 
terms: its proper Gini coefficient, its average budget share and the degree of its association 
with total expenditure (measured by their Gini correlation). The higher the value of each of 
the factors, the stronger is the contribution of the category to total inequality. The expression 
of the contribution means also that a high Gini coefficient does not guarantee a large 
contribution to total inequality. As will be seen below, because of a very low budget share the 
contribution of the item “two-wheeler purchases” is the lowest among the categories 
considered, though its Gini coefficient is the highest. 
This approach is advantageous in that it furnishes a decomposition of inequalities into 
elements easily interpretable and helps understanding their temporal evolution by examining A. Berri, S. Vincent Lyk-Jensen, I. Mulalic and T. Zachariadis  6
 
the evolution of the elements involved in the contribution of each component. Moreover, it 
avoids a major shortcoming of the usual method called before-after. The latter consists in 
calculating an inequality index after excluding a particular component and comparing it with 
the value of the index when this component is included. The results of this method may 
depend on the order in which the components are considered. For instance, in the case of two 
income sources, Lerman (1999) shows that a component will appear reducing inequalities or, 
on the contrary, increasing them according to whether one accounts for it before or after the 
other component. 
 
2.4. Redistributive Effects of Marginal Changes in the Components 
Another advantage of this decomposition is that it allows evaluating the redistributive effects 
of marginal changes in the different expenditure categories. It has to be noted that no explicit 
income transfer is considered here. The expression ‘redistributive effect’ refers to the impact 
in terms of increase or reduction of inequality.  
Suppose that the expenditure on a particular item    undergoes a small percentage 
variation,  , identical for all households (e.g. a tax), such that 
k
k e ( ) ( ) 1 kk kk x ee x =+ 0 k e > ,  .I n  
terms of variation of a tax   on expenditure  , one has  k t k ( ) ( ) 1 kk k k x dt dt x =+ . The initial rate   
does not appear, its effect being incorporated in the observation on 
k t
k x . The tax change is 
imposed on the expenditure made,  k x , which is equivalent to a tax proportional to the price 
paid by the consumer. The effect on the global Gini is (Stark et al., 1986): 









the terms  ,  ,   and G  being evaluated before the marginal variation in component   
takes place. Dividing by  , one obtains 









= − . (8) 
Equation (8) shows that the relative variation of the global Gini due to a small variation in 
expenditure on component k is equal to the relative contribution of the component to overall 
inequality minus its contribution to total expenditure. The sum of all relative marginal effects 
equals 0. Multiplication by 1  of all components leaves the overall Gini unchanged. It is 
also evident that, as long as the budget share   is not zero: 
e +
k S
A.  the relative marginal effect is negative  if the Gini correlation between expenditure   
and total expenditure is negative or null (
k
0 k R ≤ ); 
B.  if the Gini correlation is positive, the impact on inequality depends on the sign of 
( ). A necessary condition for this term to be positive is that the inequality of 
component   exceeds that of total expenditure:   (since  ). 
kk RG G −
k k GG > 1 k R ≤
Equation (8) defines the concept of progressivity used here (Yitzhaki, 1997). A tax will be 
called progressive if an increase in this tax (or its imposition if it does not exist yet) reduces 
inequality of total expenditure (after taxes). A tax will be called regressive if it increases total 
inequality. This definition can also be justified as follows. Consider the compensation that is 
necessary to preserve the level of well-being enjoyed by each household before the 
modification in taxation. If the compensation is progressive (i.e. its share increases with total 
expenditure or income), the change in the tax affects the rich more than the poor. The tax is 
then progressive and its increase (or its imposition) will yield a decrease in inequalities. 
Conversely, if the compensation is regressive (i.e. its share decreases when total expenditure A. Berri, S. Vincent Lyk-Jensen, I. Mulalic and T. Zachariadis  7
 
increases), the modification in the tax affects the poor more than the rich. The tax is therefore 
regressive and its increase (or its imposition) will induce an increase in inequalities. 
If the expenditure component is a decreasing function of total expenditure (or income), as 
is the case of a regressive tax paid by all households, then its Gini correlation with total 
expenditure is -1 and the relative marginal effect is negative. Consequently, when the relative 
marginal effect is negative, the taxation should increase inequalities, as would a regressive tax 
do. If the component is an increasing function of total expenditure, as for a progressive or 
proportional tax, then its Gini correlation with total expenditure is +1. One is then in the 
configuration (B) above, and the sign of the relative marginal effect depends on the quantities 
,   and G .  k R k G
Hence, the interpretation of equation (8) in terms of the impact on total inequality of (an 
increase of) a tax on an expenditure category   is as follows: when the relative marginal 
effect is positive (negative) the taxation should reduce (increase) global inequality. Such a tax 
would be progressive (regressive). 
k
Besides, the decomposition described above provides estimates of elasticities (called Gini 
elasticities) with respect to total expenditure without specifying a functional form for the 
Engel curves. The term 












can be interpreted as the elasticity of expenditure   with respect to total expenditure. Indeed,  k









β =  (10) 
can be seen as a non-parametric estimator of the marginal propensity to spend on the category 
of goods and services   (Olkin and Yitzhaki, 1992; Yitzhaki, 1994).  k









η = − . (11) 
Equation (11) makes even more immediate the interpretation of the relative marginal effect, in 
agreement with the usual classification of taxes according to elasticities with respect to 
income. A tax is progressive if it is imposed on a luxury commodity ( k η >1), in which case 
the relative marginal effect is positive. It is regressive if it is imposed on a necessary or 
inferior good ( k η <1); in this case, the relative marginal effect is negative. However, the 
extent of the relative marginal effect depends on the magnitude of the component’s budget 




3. TRANSPORT EXPENDITURES IN THE HOUSEHOLD BUDGET 
 
This section describes the budget shares of different transport items by standard of living and 
their temporal pattern. Households are grouped into quintiles of total expenditure, deflated by 
the number of consumption units (CU) to account for their composition. The number of CUs 
in a household is determined according to the Oxford scale: 1 for the reference person (or 
head), 0.7 for any other member aged 14 or older, and 0.5 for each child of less than 14 years 
of age. The choice of total expenditure as a classifying variable is justified by the fact that 
expenditure data are more reliable than income data in budget surveys. On the other hand, a 
measure based on consumption (more precisely, expenditures) is more relevant than a A. Berri, S. Vincent Lyk-Jensen, I. Mulalic and T. Zachariadis  8
 
                                                
measure based on income to give an account of the level of material well-being, because 
households tend to smooth their consumption so as to maintain a stable standard of living over 
time (Rogers and Gray, 1994; Slesnick, 2001). 
Private transport expenditures include purchases of cars and two-wheelers, insurance costs 
for cars and two-wheelers, purchases of fuels, lubricants, tyres and accessories, maintenance 
and repair costs, parking costs, lock-up garage or parking-lot rental costs, car licence and 
annual registration taxes, and vehicle-use-related fines. 
To understand some of the differences between the countries in our sample as regards 
transport expenditures and their effect on inequality, some background information is 
necessary about vehicle taxation systems in each country
2. 
In France, the VAT rate on automobile purchases was as high as 33.33% until 1987. It then 
gradually decreased: 28% in Sep. 1987, 25% in Sep. 1989, 22% in Sep. 1990, and 18.6% (rate 
imposed on the majority of commodities) in April 1991. As for most products, the rate 
increased to 20.6% in August 1995, then decreased to 19.6% since April 2000. A car 
registration tax is paid when a vehicle is bought, whether new or second-hand; it is also paid 
when changing residential location from a prefecture to another. The tax is calculated on the 
basis of engine size expressed in fiscal horsepower. The tax rate per horsepower is fixed at the 
province level. In 1995, this rate varied between 95 FF (about 14.5 EUR) and 195 FF (about 
19.7 EUR). In 2008, it ranged from 27 EUR to 46.15 EUR. Besides, there is an annual tax on 
ownership of a vehicle (this tax is no more imposed on households from 2001 on) and taxes 
on insurance. As for fuels, the domestic tax on petroleum products (TIPP) and VAT (19.6%) 
apply.   
The structure of taxes and duties put on the car in Denmark is exceptionally complex. 
There have been many attempts to alter the taxation of private vehicles to obtain more energy-
efficient car transport. The last significant reform was completed in 1997. The most important 
objective was to reduce taxes on car ownership and simultaneously increase taxes on car use 
by increasing petrol duties. However, the price of new cars in Denmark is much higher than in 
other countries due to the high vehicle registration fee. For example, the registration tax in 
2003 (charged on the basis of the retail price) is 105% of the first 7,653 EUR of the value and 
180% of the remainder! In addition, all cars are subject to VAT at 25%. Besides an annual 
road tax, a supplementary tax is also imposed on vehicles using fuel other than gasoline. All 
motor fuels are subject to VAT (25%).  
Car taxation in Cyprus has changed several times during the last two decades. Prior to the 
year 2003 registration taxes and annual vehicle taxes were calculated on the basis of vehicle 
weight and were higher for diesel powered cars; from 2003 onwards taxes are based on 
engine size regardless of the fuel they use, and are further differentiated according to carbon 
dioxide emissions (with low CO2 cars enjoying tax reductions and high CO2 cars bearing an 
additional tax penalty). Tax rates have changed again in the year 2006. As regards second-
hand cars, their current tax levels, also calculated on the basis of engine size, decrease with 
age. Regarding fuel taxes, the major difference between the two survey years was VAT. This 
tax was introduced only from 1992 onwards at the rate of 5%; its rate was of 15% in 2003. In 
1991, the excise tax was 0.1048 Cyprus pounds per litre (0.18 eurocents per litre), for both 
petrol and diesel fuel. This was 0.1748 Cyprus pounds per litre (0.30 eurocents per litre) in 
2003. 
Table 1 presents the expenditure shares for private transport in the three countries. The 
average expenditure devoted by French households to private transport (mainly car 
acquisition and use expenses) remained stable at about 14% of the total budget and then 
decreased slightly since the mid-1990s. However, this share differs greatly according to the 
 
2 A detailed account of taxation systems in France and Denmark is provided, for example, by Bückman and 
Rienstra (1998). A. Berri, S. Vincent Lyk-Jensen, I. Mulalic and T. Zachariadis  9
 
standard of living and grows with income: the gap between the first and last quintiles is up to 
9 percentage points.  
 
TABLE 1 Budget Shares of Private Transport 
Quintile ∗  France Cyprus  Denmark 
  1979 1989 2000 1991 2003 1997 2005 
1 7.2 8.3 8.1 9.4 8.6 7.0 7.6 
  [6.8; 7.6]  [7.8; 8.7]  [7.7; 8.5]  [8.5; 10.3]  [7.8; 9.4]  [6.0; 8.1]  [6.3; 8.9] 
2 10.9  10.7 9.9 14.0  11.5 7.5 11.9 
  [10.4; 11.5]  [10.2; 11.2]  [9.4; 10.3]  [12.7; 15.2]  [10.5; 12.5]  [6.4; 8.6]  [9.9; 13.9] 
3  12.5 13.0 11.8 16.8 13.4  9.8  13.4 
  [11.9; 13.1]  [12..3; 13..6]  [11.3; 12.4]  [15.3; 18.3]  [12.2; 14.5]  [8.4; 11.3]  [11.2; 15.6] 
4  15.2 15.7 14.0 23.2 13.7 17.9 15.8 
  [14.5; 15.8]  [14.9; 16.4]  [11.4; 14.6]  [21.2; 25.3]  [12.5; 14.8]  [15.3; 20.5]  [13.2; 18.3] 
5  15.1 16.9 12.2 25.1 20.0 29.8 25.1 
  [14.4; 15.7]  [16.0; 17.8]  [11.6; 12.8]  [22.7; 27.4]  [18.2; 21.7]  [25.5; 34.2]  [21.3; 29.0] 
All  hhs.  13.5 14.4 11.9 21.3 15.3 17.6 17.0 
  [13.2; 13.8]  [14.0; 14.7]  [11.6; 12.3]  [20.2; 22.3]  [14.6; 15.9]  [16.4; 18.9]  [15.7; 18.3] 
Sources: Household expenditure surveys. 
∗ Quintiles of total expenditure by consumption unit (Oxford scale). 
Note: Confidence intervals at 95% are given in square brackets. 
 
The same patterns can be observed in Denmark and Cyprus, but with notably larger budget 
shares. The gap between the first and last quintiles is even higher in these two countries, 
particularly in Denmark where it reached 23 percentage points in 1997. This reflects the 
structuring of household automobile equipment by their income level, even though car 
diffusion progressed over the period: as shown in Table 2 below, the number of cars per 
household increased more strongly for the lowest incomes. Table 1 displays also a 
considerable decline of the budget share of private transport in Cyprus. This is mainly due to 
a decrease in car purchase costs after 1993, following a relaxation of restrictions on imports of 
second-hand cars: the maximum allowable age of an imported vehicle was raised from two to 
five years. Consequently, from 1993 onwards, second-hand cars constituted the majority of 
new car registrations in the country. Moreover, new cars became cheaper too: Clerides (2008) 
found evidence of a 5-10% drop in the real price of new automobiles as a result of this 
regulatory change. 
Table 2 provides interesting insights of vehicle ownership levels depending on the standard 
of living. In the case of Denmark, the large differences according to income are largely due to 
the effect of heavy taxes imposed on automobiles, making cars affordable only to households 
with relatively high incomes. These high car costs can also explain the very low overall levels 
of car ownership, as compared to Cypriot and French households. 
 A. Berri, S. Vincent Lyk-Jensen, I. Mulalic and T. Zachariadis  10
 
TABLE 2 Number of vehicles per household 
Quintile ∗   France  Cyprus Denmark 
  1979  1989  2000 1991 2003 1997 2005 
1  0.43  0.60  0.72 0.37 0.65 0.45 0.56 
2  0.75  0.93  1.08 1.02 1.26 0.58 0.85 
3  0.93  1.08  1.23 1.20 1.57 0.77 0.98 
4  1.07  1.18  1.36 1.36 1.81 0.94 0.96 
5  1.13  1.29  1.42 1.59 1.88 1.11 1.13 
All  hhs.  0.86  1.02  1.16 1.11 1.43 0.77 0.90 
Sources: Household expenditure surveys. 
∗ Quintiles of total expenditure by consumption unit (Oxford scale). 
 
Coming to the budget share of public transport, illustrated in Table 3, this is very low, 
particularly in France and Cyprus. The decline in budget shares in Cyprus is mainly due to the 
fact that public transport modes (buses) have almost disappeared in the country between the 
two survey years 1991 and 2003: according to official statistics, the total number of 
passengers has decreased by 50% during this period, and currently public transport accounts 
for 1.8% of total trips and 2.7% of total passenger kilometres travelled (CYSTAT, 2008). 
Rising incomes, urban sprawl and – most importantly – lack of investments in public 
transport infrastructure are responsible for this decline of bus transport. 
In general, there is no regular pattern related to income level, probably because of a 
diversity of contexts in terms of urbanisation and population density, and hence as to the 
availability of local public transport means.  
 
TABLE 3 Budget Shares of Public Transport 
Quintile ∗  France Cyprus  Denmark 
  1979 1989 2000 1991 2003 1997 2005 
1  0.78 0.98 0.85 3.09 0.84 3.96 3.32 
  [0.74 ; 0.82]  [0.93 ; 1.03]  [0.81 ; 0.89]  [2.78 ; 3.40]  [0.76 ; 0.92]  [3.35 ; 4.57]  [2.76 ; 3.88] 
2  0.91 0.81 0.84 2.24 1.05 3.76 2.26 
  [0.87 ; 0.95]  [0.77 ; 0.85]  [0.80 ; 0.88]  [2.04 ; 2.44]  [0.96 ; 1.14]  [3.21 ; 4.31]  [1.88 ; 2.64] 
3  0.99 0.93 0.94 1.98 1.07 3.40 2.59 
  [0.99 ; 1.03]  [0.88 ; 0.98]  [0.90 ; 0.98]  [1.80 ; 2.16]  [0.98 ; 1.16]  [2.90 ; 3.90]  [2.17 ; 3.01] 
4  1.10 1.07 1.13 1.85 1.25 3.23 3.64 
  [1.05 ; 1.15]  [1.02 ; 1.12]  [1.08 ; 1.18]  [1.69 ; 2.01]  [1.14 ; 1.36]  [2.76 ; 3.70]  [3.05 ; 4.23] 
5  1.39 1.35 1.18 1.69 1.32 3.32 3.22 
  [1.33 ; 1.45]  [1.28 ; 1.42]  [1.12 ; 1.24]  [1.53 ; 1.85]  [1.20 ; 1.44]  [2.83 ; 3.81]  [2.72 ; 3.72] 
All  hhs.  1.14 1.10 1.06 1.91 1.19 3.45  3.06 
  [1.11 ; 1.17]  [1.07 ; 1.13]  [1.03 ; 1.09]  [1.82 ; 2.00]  [1.14 ; 1.24]  [3.20 ; 3.70]  [2.82 ; 3.30] 
Sources: Household expenditure surveys. 
∗ Quintiles of total expenditure by consumption unit (Oxford scale). 
Note: Confidence intervals at 95% are given in square brackets. A. Berri, S. Vincent Lyk-Jensen, I. Mulalic and T. Zachariadis  11
 
 
4. CONSUMPTION INEQUALITIES AND REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF TAXES 
 
Transport expenditures are grouped into sufficiently homogeneous categories: automobile 
purchases, two-wheeler purchases, fuels, other vehicle use items, and public transport. The 
results in this section are presented for these categories as well as in aggregate form. 
To account for household composition, all estimations were carried out on the basis of 
expenditures per consumption unit (as defined in the Oxford scale). In the estimations, the 
data were weighted by the respective survey weights of the households. The estimators of all 
the parameters of the decomposition of the Gini coefficient are efficient (i.e., asymptotically 
unbiased), and their distributions converge to a normal distribution (Schechtman and 
Yitzhaki, 1987). Thus, estimation of their standard errors allows constructing confidence 
intervals according to values of a normal distribution. Standard errors are estimated with the 
jackknife method. For a random variable  X  observed on a sample of size  , the jackknife 
estimation of the standard error of an estimator 
n
( ) ( ) 1 ˆˆ ,, n X XX θθ = …  goes through two 
stages (see e.g. Efron and Gong, 1983): 
(1) estimation of   values  n () () ˆ
i X θ ,  1, , in = … , where  ( ) () ˆ
i X θ  is  ( ˆ ) X θ  calculated after 
deleting observation   (i.e., based on  i X 1 n−  observations) ; 
(2) utilisation of the   values  n ( ) () ˆ
i X θ  to estimate the standard error of  ( ˆ ) X θ  by 
















⎣⎦ ∑ ,  
where  () () ˆ X θ •  is the average of  ( ) () ˆ
i X θ ,  1, , in = … . 
Before examining the estimation results, it is worth noting certain characteristics of the 
data used. First, the observed expenditures are the result of choices made under income and 
price constraints. Moreover, by their nature, some goods and services are not purchased in a 
frequent and regular manner (e.g. durables). Likewise, some expenditures are conditional to 
others or to the existence of a stock of durables, as is the case with vehicle use expenditures. 
Finally, at household level certain expenditures may be insufficiently recorded because of the 
survey method and/or the observation period.  
The effect of these aspects on the estimations appears, notably, through the more or less 
large frequency of zero expenditures in the sample. The level of a Gini coefficient indicates 
the degree of disparities between households in terms of expenditures on a category of goods 
and/or services. These disparities reflect differences in terms of amounts spent as well as how 
widespread these expenditures are among households. In general, as Garner (1993, p. 137) 
points out, the greater is the proportion of zero expenditures, whether as a result of consumer 
choice or due to the method of observation, the higher is the corresponding Gini index. 
 
4.1. Inequalities and Redistributive Effects 
4.1.1. Inequalities by Expenditure Item and their Contribution to Overall Inequality 
Table 4 presents the estimated Gini coefficients for each one of the household surveys used in 
this study. The lowest Gini coefficients are observed in the categories of expenditures on 
vehicle use (fuels and other items). This is not surprising because vehicle use expenditures are 
increasingly widespread in the population with rising car ownership over the years. Then 
come, in ascending order, the Gini indices of expenditures on public transport and on car 
purchases. Finally, two-wheeler purchases exhibit the highest concentration. This can be 
explained by the relative scarcity of these purchases. For instance, they represent on average 
about 1% of the transport budget among French households, and 0.2% of their total budget. A. Berri, S. Vincent Lyk-Jensen, I. Mulalic and T. Zachariadis  12
 
 
TABLE 4 Gini Coefficients by Expenditure Item 
Expenditure item  France Cyprus  Denmark 
  1979 1989 2000 1991 2003 1997 2005 
Private  transport  0.671 0.668 0.643 0.698 0.601 0.704 0.617 
  [0.664; 0.679]  [0.662; 0.675] [0.636; 0.650] [0.685; 0.712] [0.585; 0.617] [0.726; 0.682]  [0.588; 0.646]
Veh.  purchases  0.897 0.883 0.895 0.891 0.916 0.901 0.897 
  [0.892; 0.902]  [0.878; 0.888] [0.890; 0.900] [0.881; 0.902] [0.908; 0.924] [0.886; 0.916]  [0.877; 0.917]
Automobiles  0.905 0.888 0.902 0.893 0.919 0.912 0.910 
  [0.900; 0.910]  [0.883; 0.894] [0.897; 0.907] [0.882; 0.903] [0.911; 0.927] [0.896; 0.927 ]  [0.890; 0.931]
2-wheelers 0.956 0.977 0.972 0.987 0.993 0.976 0.931 
  [0.949; 0.962]  [0.973; 0.980] [0.968; 0.975] [0.975; 0.999] [0.991; 0.995] [0.960; 0.992]  [0.907; 0.955]
Fuels  0.645 0.579 0.571 0.564 0.472 0.652 0.620 
  [0.635; 0.654]  [0.571; 0.587] [0.563; 0.579] [0.547; 0.581] [0.459; 0.486] [0.624; 0.679]  [0.586; 0.655]
Other  use  exp.  0.690 0.648 0.644 0.530 0.450 0.594 0.508 
  [0.676; 0.704]  [0.636; 0.660] [0.628; 0.659] [0.515; 0.546] [0.437; 0.462] [0.563; 0.624]  [0.471; 0.544]
Public  transport  0.889 0.882 0.862 0.777 0.791 0.679 0.714 
  [0.881; 0.897]  [0.870; 0.894] [0.851; 0.873] [0.764; 0.789] [0.780; 0.802] [ 0.646; 0.711]  [0.684; 0.745]
All  transport  0.644 0.638 0.617 0.658 0.578 0.611 0.541 
  [0.637; 0.652]  [0.631; 0.645] [0.610; 0.625] [0.644; 0.672] [0.562; 0.594] [0.587; 0.636]  [0.512; 0.569]
Total  expend.  0.338 0.336 0.356 0.397 0.306 0.224 0.222 
  [0.333; 0.344]  [0.329; 0.343] [0.348; 0.365] [0.385; 0.409] [0.298; 0.315] [0.212; 0.236]  [0.206; 0.238]
Sources: Household expenditure surveys. 
Note: Confidence intervals at 95% are given in square brackets. 
 
Except for the case of vehicle purchases for which there is no regular temporal pattern 
(probably because purchases of durables are not made frequently), Table 4 shows that 
inequalities have generally decreased in all countries over time. In particular, there has been a 
steady decrease in the case of expenditures on fuels and other vehicle use items.  
The contribution of each transport expenditure category to the overall inequality in a 
country is displayed in Table 5. As equation (6) shows, the contribution of a component to 
overall inequality is determined by three factors: the proper inequality of the component 
(measured by its Gini coefficient), its degree of association with total expenditure (measured 
by their Gini correlation), and its weight in the total budget. Thus, despite a very high Gini 
coefficient (close to 1), the relative contribution of two-wheeler purchases to overall 
inequality is insignificant in all three countries, due to their small budget share and their weak 
association with total expenditure. By contrast, the relative contribution of car purchases is 
much more important in all countries (ranging from 8% to 27%) despite slightly lower Gini 
coefficients; this is due to greater budget shares and stronger correlation with total 
expenditure. In terms of significance for overall inequality, this component is followed by 
vehicle use expenditures other than fuels, then by fuels, and finally by expenditures on public 
transport. In the case of France, inequalities among households regarding transport as a whole 
are essentially attributable to automobile purchases (44% to 58% depending on the survey 
period), followed by vehicle use expenditures other than fuels (21% to 26%) and fuels (13% 
to 22%). The contribution of public transport is more modest (6% to 8%). That of two-
wheelers expenditures is even lower (less than 2%). Over the whole observation period, the 
contribution to overall inequality declines in the case of fuels and of the remaining vehicle use 
expenditures. It also declines slightly for public transport. The contribution of two-wheelers 
purchases remains stable at a negligible level. The contribution of transport as a whole A. Berri, S. Vincent Lyk-Jensen, I. Mulalic and T. Zachariadis  13
 
decreases at the end of the period after a slight increase, thus following the trend of the most 
important of its components (car purchases).  
 
TABLE 5 Relative Contribution to Overall Inequality (%) 
Expenditure item  France Cyprus  Denmark 
 1979  1989  2000 1991 2003 1997  2005 
Private transport  16.5  18.4  13.4  28.1  22.3  40.9  31.6 
 (0.41)  (0.50)  (0.42)  (1.3)  (1.0)  (3.40)  (3.02) 
Vehicle purchases  7.7  11.7  7.9  22.0  15.3  30.0  21.2 
 (0.28)  (0.42)  (0.32)  (1.3)  (1.0)  (3.29)  (2.86) 
Automobiles 7.6  11.4  7.8  21.8  15.1  27.3  20.8 
 (0.28)  (0.42)  (0.32)  (1.3)  (1.0)  (3.13)  (2.87) 
Two-wheelers 0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  2.7  0.4 
 (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.17)  (0.09)  (1.15)  (0.15) 
Fuels 3.9  2.6  2.1  2.8  3.5  3.7  4.5 
 (0.12)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.2)  (0.1)  (0.37)  (0.57) 
Other use exp.  4.9  4.2  3.3  3.3  3.5  7.2  5.9 
 (0.26)  (0.19)  (0.21)  (0.2)  (0.1)  (0.67)  (0.76) 
 Public transport  1.7  1.6  1.4  1.5  1.4  2.8  3.5 
 (0.13)  (0.18)  (0.13)  (0.1)  (0.1)  (0.75)  (0.63) 
All transport  18.2  20.1  14.7  29.6  23.6  43.6  35.1 
 (0.42)  (0.50)  (0.45)  (1.3)  (1.0)  (3.31)  (2.91) 
Sources: Household expenditure surveys. 
Note: Standard errors are given in brackets. 
 
Similar trends show up in the cases of Cyprus and Denmark. The notable differences lie in 
the greater contribution of car-related components to global inequality, especially car 
purchases. This contribution is highest for Denmark, as expected in view of the very high 
motoring costs. 
4.1.2. Redistributive Effects of Taxes by Expenditure Item 
Table 6 displays the estimated effect on overall inequality (i.e. inequality of total expenditure) 
of a marginal change in each transport expenditure item. In the case of France, it turns out that 
taxes on transport commodities as a whole remain progressive, though to a lesser extent in 
2000 than earlier: a 1% proportional increase of transport expenditures would have reduced 
global inequality by 2% in the early 2000’s (compared to 5% previously). The progressivity 
of taxes on transport as a whole is mainly due to the progressive character of taxes on car 
purchases, strongly linked to income and with a higher budget share than for the other 
expenditure items. However, with the diffusion of the automobile and of its use, taxes on 
vehicle use items are less and less progressive and become even regressive in the case of 
fuels. Though the extent of the induced variations is very small (the relative marginal effect 
decreased from 0.1% to -1%), the trend is important: it reflects a gradual transformation of the 
distributions of these expenditures with the growing penetration of cars in the population. The 
slightly progressive character of taxes on public transport services is to be attributed to long 
distance trips. Indeed, as shown in (Berri, 2005), taxes on local public transport appear to be 
neutral at national level (i.e. neither progressive nor regressive). However, this result conceals 
a diversity of local conditions in terms of supply of these transport means according to the 
degree of urbanization and population density. Effectively, these taxes prove to be regressive 
when focusing on the Greater Paris region, a large urban area very well endowed with public A. Berri, S. Vincent Lyk-Jensen, I. Mulalic and T. Zachariadis  14
 
transport infrastructure. As regards purchases of two-wheelers, which are rare, there seems to 
be no effect whatsoever on global inequalities. 
 
TABLE 6 Change in Overall Inequality due to a Marginal Change in a Component (%)  
Expenditure item  France Cyprus  Denmark 
 1979  1989  2000  1991 2003 1997 2005 
Individual  transport  4.0 4.9 1.9 7.4 7.5  23.2  14.6 
Vehicle  purchases 3.0 5.1 2.9 9.3 8.7  20.4  13.9 
Automobiles  3.0 5.1 3.0 9.3 8.6  18.6  13.9 
Two-wheelers 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.8 0.0 
Fuels  0.1 -0.6 -1.0 -1.0 -0.6 1.0  0.9 
Other use exp.  0.9  0.3  -0.1  -1.0  -0.5  1.9  -0.2 
Public  transport  0.4 0.4 0.2 -0.5 0.2 -0.7 0.5 
All  transport  4.4 5.3 2.1 6.9 7.7  22.5  15.1 
Sources: Household expenditure surveys. 
 
The (Gini) elasticities with respect to total expenditure, as shown in Table 7, confirm the 
above conclusions as to the regressive (elasticity < 1) or progressive (elasticity > 1) character 
of a tax on a category of expenditures. 
 
TABLE 7 Total Expenditure (Gini) Elasticities – France 
Expenditure  item  1979 1989 2000 
 Individual transport  1.318 [1.280 ; 1.356] 1.358 [1.317 ; 1.399] 1.165 [1.122; 1.208]
 Vehicle purchases 1.635 [1.577 ; 1.692] 1.779 [1.720 ; 1.839] 1.588 [1.526; 1.650]
 Automobiles  1.668 [1.609 ; 1.727] 1.797 [1.737 ; 1.857] 1.616 [1.553 ; 1.680]
 Two-wheelers  0.809 [0.534 ; 1.084] 1.155 [0.920 ; 1.389] 0.860 [0.684 ; 1.036]
 Fuels  1.020 [0.977 ; 1.062] 0.817 [0.780 ; 0.854] 0.688 [0.651 ; 0.725]
 Other use exp.   1.228 [1.154 ; 1.301] 1.083 [1.023 ; 1.143] 0.975 [0.898 ; 1.055]
 Public transport  1.364 [1.243 ; 1.485] 1.346 [1.179 ; 1.513] 1.215 [1.088 ; 1.342]
 All transport  1.322 [1.287 ; 1.357] 1.357 [1.318 ; 1.395] 1.169 [1.127 ; 1.212]
Sources: Household expenditure surveys. 
Note: Confidence intervals at 95% are given in square brackets. 
 
Thus, the luxury character of transport commodities as a whole is obvious (with an 
elasticity of 1.32 in 1979, 1.36 in 1989 and 1.17 in 2000), because of the predominance of car 
purchases (the elasticity of which ranges between 1.6 and 1.8). Vehicle use expenditures show 
continuously decreasing elasticities (from 1 to 0.7 for fuels and from 1.2 to 1 for the 
remaining vehicle use items), thus confirming the more and more necessary character of the 
car. The same decreasing tendency is observed for the elasticity of public transport (from 1.4 A. Berri, S. Vincent Lyk-Jensen, I. Mulalic and T. Zachariadis  15
 
to 1.2). However, as mentioned previously, these elasticities give information on the sign of 
the relative marginal effect, but not on its magnitude. 
Although the results are qualitatively similar in the two other countries, there are 
significant differences in magnitudes. The largest contrast is between Denmark and France. 
The progressivity of taxes on car purchases is much stronger in Denmark. As pointed out 
earlier, these taxes are so high that car purchase costs can be afforded only by high incomes. 
Given the higher share of car purchases in the total budget as compared to other transport 
components, taxes on all transport are also much more progressive. Also, fuel taxes are still 
progressive in this country. Cyprus shows intermediate figures: in particular, taxes on fuels 
are slightly regressive and the impact on overall inequality is of the same order of magnitude 
as for France. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSPORT POLICY 
 
Inequalities between households as regards the consumption of transport goods and services 
as well as the redistributive effects of taxes on various expenditure categories have been 
evaluated for three European countries. A decomposition by expenditure component of the 
Gini inequality index was applied, using individual-level data from repeated cross-sections of 
expenditure surveys spanning long time periods. The results highlight the effect of the gradual 
penetration of cars in the European population in the last decades.  
Inequality regarding transport is mainly attributable to automobile purchases, followed by 
vehicle use items other than fuels, and fuels. The relative contribution of public transport is 
very small, due to a small budget share. The relative contribution of car use items decreased 
over time, thus reflecting the increasingly widespread use of the car. 
Taxes on transport goods and services as a whole are progressive, i.e. they affect the rich 
more than the poor. However, this is principally due to the progressivity of taxes on 
automobile purchases, strongly linked to income and with a high budget share as compared to 
the remaining types of expenditures. On the contrary, taxes on fuels are regressive (i.e., they 
affect the poor more than the rich) except in Denmark, whereas the progressive character of 
taxes on the other vehicle use goods and services has become weaker over the years. This, 
again, is an evidence of the effect of the diffusion of the car, becoming more and more of a 
necessity rather than a luxury.  
The above findings, more or less typical of socio-economic conditions in all European 
countries, offer some interesting policy implications. Policy makers should not ignore equity 
issues when considering measures to attenuate the environmental impact of cars (pollutant 
emissions, congestion and noise) in order not to worsen social inequalities. Increasing car use 
costs, notably fuel prices, through an increase of uniform taxes would be particularly 
inequitable. In particular, the least wealthy of car-dependent households living in low-densely 
populated zones would face a heavy burden that they cannot avoid. Indeed, as shown by the 
example of the Greater Paris region (Berri, 2007), the peripheral location of modest income 
households, because of high property prices in the centre of the urban area, involves transport 
expenditures (mainly car purchase and running costs) that increase with distance from the 
centre. These expenditure levels are not necessarily chosen, but are induced by the absence of 
a credible alternative to the car. McCann et al. (2000) show similar patterns in the case of 
American urban areas. The drift towards remote areas is in particular favoured by the fact that 
mortgage lenders do not take account of transport expenditures when awarding home 
purchase loans (Bardy, 2001; Hare, 1995). By so doing, they consider that life in the outskirts 
(where land and property prices are lower, but badly served by public transport) is more 
affordable than in the centre. 
Area-specific measures may be more appropriate. In the case of dense urban areas, urban 
tolls and restrictions of access are examples of such measures. In parallel, public transport 
supply has to be improved in terms of lines of service, speed, punctuality, comfort, etc. In A. Berri, S. Vincent Lyk-Jensen, I. Mulalic and T. Zachariadis  16
 
addition, a global approach should include actions on the housing sector so as to increase the 
density of the urban fabric and attenuate the sprawl tendency. Besides the necessity of taking 
into account transport costs in the evaluation of solvency, measures improving the housing 
market conditions may consist of stimulating construction and promoting low-cost 
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The Gini correlation between two random variables  X  and Y  is a measure of their degree of 
association, based on the Gini Mean Difference (11). The Gini correlation coefficient is 
intermediate between the (usual) Pearson correlation coefficient and the rank-based Spearman 
correlation coefficient, the expressions of which are respectively 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ,c o v , v a rv a r X YX YX ρ = Y  and 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ,c o v , v a rv a r SX Y X rX Y RR R R = Y . 
X R  and   represent the ranks according to the values of  Y R X  and Y , respectively. Divided by 
the size of the population or sample, they give the (empirical) cumulative distributions of the 
corresponding variables. Pearson correlation is based on the covariance of the two variables, 
whereas Spearman correlation is based on the covariance of their cumulative distributions. 
Gini correlation is a compromise between the two: it uses the covariance between one of the 
two variables and the cumulative distribution of the other. It is a non-symmetric measure and 
can take the two following forms:  
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , cov , cov , YX R XY XG Y XF X = , 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , cov , cov , XY R YX YF X YG Y = . 
In general, the two correlations  ( , ) R XY  and  ( ) , R YX are not equal. 
The properties of the Gini correlation coefficient combine properties of the Pearson and 
Spearman coefficients (11). Among these properties:  
•  for every () , X Y ,   ;  () 1, RXY −≤ ≤ 1
•  if  X  and Y  are independent,  ( ) ( ) ,, RXY RYX 0 = =  ; 
•  if   is an increasing (resp. decreasing) monotone function of  Y X , not necessarily 
linear,  ( , ) R XY  and  ( , ) R YX will be equal to +1 (resp., -1); and 
•  if () , X Y  has a bivariate normal distribution with parameters  X µ ,  Y µ , 
2
X σ , 
2
Y σ  and ρ , 
then  () () ,, RXY RYX ρ == . 
 